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I. INTRODUCTION: LUCAS AND "BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES"
In the 1992 case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1 the United
States Supreme Court created its now famous "categorical rule" for
regulatory takings. Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the rule requires the government to provide just
compensation whenever it denies a property owner all "economically
beneficial use" of land. Neither the purposes behind the denial nor the
circumstances under which the land is acquired can diminish the
government's liability. 2
The Lucas Court did, however, establish two exceptions to the
otherwise inflexible "categorical rule," declaring that the rule does not
apply if: first, the challenged regulation prevents a nuisance or, second,
the regulation is grounded in a state's background principles of property
law.3 Because the law of nuisance is full and comprehensive, as well as
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505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2 Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-32-
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comprehensible, the first exception presents little difficulty. 4 Leaving
nothing to chance, the Lucas Court explained that the nuisance exception
would allow the government to prohibit the construction of a power
plant on an earthquake fault line or the filling of a lakebed that was
likely to result in flood damage to a neighbor without incurring taLkings
liability.5 In contrast, the Court was silent with respect to the meaning of
the second, "background principles of state property law," exception.
A major and often unexplored question in takings law is the extent
of the background principles exception. The subject is important for two
distinct reasons. First, it is not always easy to discern what comprises
such background principles. Second, once defined, the principles can,
when subject to expansive interpretation, seriously erode the basic Lucas
doctrine meant to provide compensation for regulatory takings that
deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of land. A related
issue is the extent to which background principles analysis overlaps with
the continuing discussion of the role of investment-backed expectations
in Lucas situations (there should be none) and the so-called "notice" rule
arguably raised by pre-existing state statutes in either total (Lucas) or
partial (Penn Central Transportation) takings analyses.
I1. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL LUCAS
EXCEPTIONS
Although Lucas failed to provide explicit guidance concerning the
definition of the background principles exception, it noted that
restrictions premised upon such principles "inhere in landowner's title
itself."6 On the basis of this statement, governments7 and commentators8
See, e.g., M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the
coal company had no right to conduct nuisance-like activities while surface mining in West
Virginia); Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
a mining company had no right to degrade the environment at one of its mining sites
under Colorado nuisance law); see also Colo. Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993
(Colo. 1994) (en banc) (holding federal statutes restricting the disposition of uranium mine
tailings fell within the background principles exception so as to deny a landowner use of a
sixty-one-acre parcel, even though the applicable statutes were enacted after the landowner
acquired the property). For a collection of recent exemption cases (and a summary of
takings law generally), see ROBERT MELTZ ET AL, THE TAKINGS ISSUE 167-95 (1999); David L
Callies, Regdatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspecties on Property Rights Have
Changed from Penn Central to Dolari, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28
STETSON L REV. 523 (1999).
s Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
6 Id.
7 See MICHAEL M. BERGER, ANNUAL UPDATE ON INVERSE CONDEMNATION, ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY, INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY, SB14 PL-
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have turned to state common law property doctrines to identify
underlying title limitations and, thus, background principles. From this
scrutiny, it is now clear that at least three sources of state property
restrictions may qualify as background principles within the meaning of
Lucas: statutory law existing prior to the acquisition of land, 9 custom, 10
and public trust. This Article explores these potential background
principles, reviewing judicial treatment and critiquing their application
to the categorical takings rule.
A. Statutory Law and Background Principles
Since Lucas was decided, many courts have declared restrictive state
environmental legislation to be background principles under which all
economically beneficial use of land may be denied.11 Provided that the
relevant statute predates the acquisition of land, it can thus be said to
ABA 11, 35 (Oct. 1996) (noting that "[slince Lucas, government agencies have been combing
their archives in search of arcane matters that might be said to have been a part of a
property owner's title and that severely restrict the use of land").
9 See Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings
Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal
Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that the public trust is a
"background principle" that allows regulation of barrier beaches without just
compensation); Katherine E. Stone, Sand Rights A Legal System to Protect the "Shores of the
Sea," 29 STETSON L. R.Ev. 709 (2000) (arguing that the public trust doctrine can be expanded
to restrict development on non-trust lands, for the purpose of preserving public beaches,
without triggering a taking).
9 See generally R. S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of "Investment-Backed Expectations" in Regulatory Takings
Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 449 (2001) (discussing the role of pre-existing statutes in
regulatory takings analysis).
10 See David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L REV. 1375 (1996); David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust:
Background Principles of State Property Law?, 30 ENVTL. L REP. 10003 (2000); Paul M.
Sullivan, Customary Revolutions: The Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions in Hawaii, 20
U. HAW. L REv. 99 (1999) (discussing the analysis of custom, including its application to
takings).
11 Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994) (holding a state statute prohibiting
development of lands containing Native American burial grounds as a background
principle that defeated a takings claim); Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 517
S.E.2d 406, 416 (N.C. App. 1999) (quoting Lucas in holding that, because a regulatory
scheme authorizing such restrictions was on the books at the time a hotel was built, the
right to protect the property from natural destruction was "not part of his title to begin
with"); Wooten v. S.C. Coastal Council, 510 S.E.2d 716 (S.C. 1999) (holding that the
existence of statutes requiring landowners to obtain permits to fill wetlands deprived a
landowner of Fifth Amendment relief when a permit was denied); City of Va. Beach v. Bell,
498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998).
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"inhere" in the landowner's title.' 2 New York's 1997 regulatory "takings
quartet" provides an excellent illustration of this trend.' 3 In Gazza v. New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation,14 the New York
Court of Appeals considered whether the denial of a building variance
pursuant to a wetlands protection law amounted to a Lucas taking.
Relying on the Lucas Court's observation that a categorical taking is
precluded by the background principles exception when a "logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the
proscribed use interests were not a part of his title to begin with,"15 the
court declared: "[T]he relevant property interests owned by petitioner
are defined by those State laws enacted and in effect at the time he took
title and they are not dependent on the timing of State action pursuant to
such laws."16 The simple enactment of a statutory scheme, even without
actual application of the relevant regulations, was therefore sufficient to
divest the claimant of a property interest that was previously thought to
come with the title."' Because "the only permissible uses for the subject
property were dependent upon those regulations," 8 there could be no
taking.
In Kim v. City of New York,' 9 a case decided the same day as Gazza,
the New York court again stressed that "in identifying the background
rules of State property law that inhere in an owner's title, a court should
look to the law in force, whatever its source, when the owner acquired
the property." 20 Providing further insight into the reasons for applying
statutes as background principles, the court said, "[i]t would be an
illogical and incomplete inquiry if the courts were to look exclusively to
common-law principles to identify the pre-existing rules of State
12 See Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council The Categorical and Other
"Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings Far Outweigh the "Rule," 29 ENVTL. L
939, 978-99 (1999) (noting that courts reject takings claims on the basis of pre-existing
statutes under the background principles exception).
13 See Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997); Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997); Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678
N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1997); Basile v. Town of Southhampton, 678 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1997);
Brotherton v. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 675 N.Y.S.2d 121,122-23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998);
see also Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating from the "Rule of Law,"
42 N.Y.L SCH. L. REv. 345 (1998) (providing an excellent critique of these cases).
14 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997).
Is Id. at 1039 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 US. 1003,1027 (1992)).
16 Id. at 1040-41.
17 See Radford & Breemer, supra note 9, at 490.
Is Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1040.
19 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997).
2 Id. at 315-16.
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property law, while ignoring statutory law in force when the owner
acquired title."21 Apparently, the irrationality derived from the fact that a
background principles doctrine that excluded "newly decreed or
legislated" rules would "elevate common law over statutory law."22
Never mind that such "irrationality" appears to have been openly
adopted by a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Lucas.23
Several other state courts have adopted the rule that pre-existing
statutes operate as background principles that defeat a Lucas takings
claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court, for instance, has held on two
occasions that pre-existing environmental regulations defeated the
owners' claims to compensation when development was prohibited. 24 In
City of Virginia Beach v. Bell,25 the Virginia Supreme Court applied a
similar view in considering the constitutionality of a sand dune
protection law. There, a corporation partially owned by the Bells
purchased two lots seaward of coastal sand dunes for the purpose of
erecting residential housing in 1979.26 After an initial attempt at
development failed, title to the lots vested in the Bells as individuals in
1982.27 The city rejected the Bells' development plans again in 1982.2
Meanwhile, pursuant to state law, the city passed an ordinance in 1980
that required developers to obtain a permit before using or altering sand
dune areas.29 When, in 1992, the Bells sought permission to build a third
time, the local wetlands board denied the necessary dune permit,
prompting the Bells to sue for compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. 30
In rejecting the argument that the denial of the permit triggered a
Lucas taking, the Virginia Supreme Court declared that Lucas required
South Carolina to justify its development restriction on "fundamental"
nuisance and property law only because Lucas had taken title prior to
the state's enactment of the challenged statute.31 In Bell, on the other
21 Id. at 315.
2 Id.
23 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1029-31 (1992).
24 See Wooten v. S.C. Coastal Council, 510 S.E.2d 716, 718 (S.C. 1999); Grant v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 461 S.E.d 388,391 (S.C. 1995) (holding no taking existed because the landowner's
"right to use his property did not alter from when he originally acquired title").
2 498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998).
2 See id. at 415.
v Id.
z Id.
29 Id.
• 0 See id. at 415-16.
31 Bell, 498 S.E.2d at 417-18.
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hand, the city's dune protection ordinance "predated" the Bells'
acquisition of property. 32 Therefore, the city did not have to "prove the
existence of any nuisance or property law" to justify its denial of
development.33 Rather, because the Bells took title after passage of the
law, they had never possessed the right to develop their land.34
Therefore, because the property owners could not suffer a taking of
rights they never possessed, "the City, by enacting the Ordinance, took
no property rights from [the] Bell[s]."35
B. Customary Law
Although not as popular a takings refuge as pre-existing statutes
seem to be, the ancient doctrine of custom6 is also increasingly being
treated as a Lucas exception. Customary law grants rights in specific
parcels of land to certain classes of people. Customary rights are
difficult to detect until asserted, but, once found, operate to engraft an
easement-like encumbrance on the affected land title, regardless of the
private or public character of the property. If customary law is to
represent a background principle, it is useful to understand the origins,
evolution, and application of custom in the United States. An
examination of English custom and a review of what United States
courts have done when faced with assertions of customary rights
provide the necessary background.
1. Blackstonian Custom
Customary law is in derogation of common law possessory property
rights, which William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
largely argues to protect.37  However, in writing what must be
considered a polemic in favor of the common law, Blackstone identified
3 Id. at 417.
3 Id. at 418.
3 See id. at 417.
3 Id. at 418.
3 Blackstone suggests that customary law had medieval origins. See 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARS 246-47 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., 1941). The public trust doctrine,
on the other hand, clearly originated in Roman law, where it was understood that the sea,
rivers, air, and shoreline were owned by, and accessible to, the people for the purpose of
navigation, commerce, and fishing. See THE INsrrrUrES OF JUSTMIAN 21.1, 158-59 (Thomas
Collett Sandars trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1984) (1876).
37 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 57. Although there are at least sixteen editions of the
Conrnentaries, it is generally recognized that the first edition of 1765-1769 was the most
influential in development of common law in the United States. See Bederman, supra note
10, at 1382.
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three forms of customary law: common law ("general custom"), by
which he presumably meant common law as we view it today; court
(procedural) custom of particular tribunals or courts; and "particular
customs," practiced by and affecting the inhabitants of a defined
geographical area.38 Blackstone carefully defined and delimited this
third or "particular" branch of custom, setting out seven criteria that a
customary right must meet if it is to be a "good" custom. A "good"
custom is one that is enforceable against a common law principle, for
example, of exclusive possession of private land, a situation in which
many of the disputes over custom arose. To be valid, enforceable, and
to, therefore, trump common-law principles to the contrary, a custom
had to be immemorial,39 continuous,40 peaceable, 41 reasonable, 42 certain,43
38 See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 76-78.
39 See I BLACI(SONr, supra note 36, at 76-77. Blackstone defined immemoriality as follows:
That it have been used so long, that the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary. So that if any one can shew the beginning of it. it is no
good custom. For which reason no custom can prevail against an
express act of parliament since the statute itself is a proof of a time
when such a custom did not exist.
Id.
40 See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 77. With regard to the requirement of continuity,
Blackstone stated:
It must have been continued. Any interruption would cause a
temporary ceasing: the revival gives it a new beginning, which will be
within time of memory, and thereupon the custom will be void. But
this must be understood with regard to an interruption of a right, for
an interruption of the possession only, for ten or twenty years, will not
destroy the custom. As I have a right of way by custom over another's
field, the custom is not destroyed, though I do not pass over it for ten
years; it only becomes more difficult to prove: but if the right be any
how discontinued for a day, the custom is quite at an end.
Id.
41 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 77. Blackstone defined the requirement of peacefulness
in this manner.
It must have been peaceable, and acquiesced in; not subject to
contention and dispute. For as customs owe their original to common
consent their being immemorially disputed at law or otherwise is
proof that such consent was wanting.
Id.
42 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 77. In establishing reasonableness as a requirement for a
"good" custom, Blackstone stated:
Customs must be reasonable; or rather, taken negatively, they must
not be unreasonable. Which as always, as Sir Edward Coke says, to be
understood of every unlearned man's reason, but of artificial and legal
reason, warranted by authority of law. Upon which account a custom
may be good, though the particular reason of it cannot be assigned; for
it suffeth, if no good legal reason can be assigned against it. Thus, a
custom in a parish, that no man shall put his beasts in the common till
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compulsory,44 and consistent.45 Even today, the law of custom in
England is built around Blackstone's seven criteria. 46
the third day of October would be good; and yet it would be hard to
shew the reason why that day in particular is fixed upon, rather than
the day before or after. But a custom that no cattle shall be put in till
the lord of the manor has first put in his, is unreasonable, and therefore
bad: for peradventure the lord will never put in his; and then the
tenants will lose all their profits.
Id.
4 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 78. Certainty as described by Blackstone:
Customs ought to be certain. A custom, that lands shall descend to the
most worthy of the owner's blood is void; for how shall this worth be
determined? But a custom to descend to the next male of the blood,
exclusive of females, is certain, and therefore good. A custom, to pay
two pence an acre in lieu of tithes, is good; but to pay sometimes two
pence and sometimes three pence, as the occupier of the land pleases,
is bad for its uncertainty. Yet a custom to pay a years improved value
for a fine on a copyhold estate, is good: though the value is a thing
uncertain, For the value may be ascertained; and the maxim of the law
is, id. cerfan est, quod certum reddi potest.
Id. English cases from Blackstone's time show that the requirement of certainty
encompassed certainty of practice, of locale, and of persons. See Callies, supra note 10, at
10012-14.
4 1 BLACIKSTONE, supra note 36, at 78. The requirement that customs be compulsory is so
defined:
Customs, though established buy consent, must be (when established)
compulsory; and not left to the option of every man, whether he will
use them or not. Therefore a custom, that all the inhabitants shall be
rated toward the maintenance of a bridge, will be good; but a custom,
that every man is to contribute thereto at his own pleasure, is idle and
absurd; and, indeed, no custom at all.
Id.
45 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 78. Blackstone describes the requirement of consistency
as follows:
Lastly, customs must be consistent with each other: one custom cannot
be set up in opposition to another. For if both are really customs, then
both are of equal antiquity, and both established by mutual consent:
which to say of contradictory customs is absurd. Therefore, if one man
prescribes that buy custom he has a right to have windows looking
into another's garden; the other cannot claim a right by custom to stop
up or obstruct those windows: for these two contradictory customs
cannot both be good, not both stand together. He ought rather to deny
the existence of the former custom.
Id.
46 Thus, a recent volume of Halsbury's Laws of England describes the essential attributes of
custom as follows:
To be valid, a custom must have four essential attributes: (1) it must be
immemorial; (2) it must be reasonable; (3) it must be certain in terms,
and in respect both of the locality where it is alleged to obtain and of
the persons whom it is alleged to effect, and (4) it must have continued
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2. Early United States Decisions
Until recently, one could characterize American judicial treatment of
custom as a source of law as decidedly chilly. Dealing primarily with
easements said to derive from customary use, the few early cases found
little, if any, reason to support the adoption of the English doctrine of
custom. Due in part to the prevalence of recording systems early in the
history of the country, unrecorded clouds on title based on immemorial
custom would be considered an anathema. As John Chipman Gray so
aptly commented in his definitive treatise on the rule against
perpetuities:
The objection which exists to allowing profits a pendre
by custom really applies, though in a less degree, to
allowing easements by custom .... [In a country like
most parts of America, where a population, sparsely
scattered at first, has rapidly increased in density, such
rights might become very oppressive. The clog that they
would put on the use and transfer of land would far
outweigh any advantage that could be acquired from
them. Especially it should be remembered that they
cannot be released, for no inhabitant, or body of
inhabitants, is entitled to speak for future inhabitants.
Such rights form perpetuities of the most objectionable
character. 47
Courts were especially troubled by the notion that customary rights
were immemorial in nature, for it was thought that "[alt this day and in
this age, in a government like ours, there can be little need of a resort to
such a source as custom for legal sanction."48 A Connecticut court thus
rejected an attempted assertion of custom in this fashion:
The political and legal institutions of Connecticut have
from the first differed in essential particulars from those
as of right and without interruption since its immemorial origin.
These characteristics serve a practical purpose as rules of evidence
when the existence of a custom is to be established or refuted.
12(1) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 606 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter LAWS OF
ENGLAND]. This entire section on custom is a superb explanation of custom today,
prepared by one of the pre-eminent scholars in legal history, Professor J. H. Baker, Fellow
of St Catherine's College, Cambridge. See generally id.
47 JOHN CHiPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITES 564 (4th ed. 1942).
48 Delaplane v. Crenshaw, 56 Va. 457,475 (1860).
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of England. Feudalism never existed here. There were
no manors or manorial rights. A recording system was
early set up, and has been consistently maintained,
calculated to put on paper, for perpetual preservation
and public knowledge, the sources of all titles to or
[e]ncumbrances affecting real estate. Nor have we all
the political subdivisions of lands which are found in
England. . . . Most of these terms denote forms of
communities that are unknown in this state. Under our
statute of limitations, also, rights of way may be
established by a shorter user than that required by the
English law.49
Similarly, a New Jersey court refused, based on custom, to permit
inhabitants of a town an easement to reach a riverbank:
[Ilf [this] custom . . . is to prevail according to the
common law notion of it, these lots must lie open
forever to the surprise of unsuspecting owners, and to
the curtailing [of] commerce, in its more advanced state,
of the accommodation of docks and wharves, when
perhaps a tenth part of the lots now open would be all
sufficient as watering places; a principle of such
extensive operation ought not to be strained beyond the
limits assigned to it in law. If [the] public convenience
requires highways to church, school, mill, market or
water, they are obtainable in a much more direct and
rational manner under the statute than by way of
immemorial usage and custom.50
Not surprisingly, several courts simply found that the "immemorial"
feature of custom could not transfer to America.5'
To be sure, a few states adopted some form of customary law,
though a close examination reveals less than a full embrace. For
instance, in Mayor of Galveston v. Menard,52 the Texas Supreme Court
noted only the possibility of vesting a property right by immemorial
custom but refused to apply it to the case before it or extend its
49 Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98,99 (Conn. 1905).
" Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N.J.L 125,130-31 (N.J. 1825).
51 See, e.g., id.; Delaplane, 56 Va. at 475; Harris v. Carson, 34 Va. 632, 638 (1836).
52 23 Tex. 349, 393-94 (1859).
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application in Texas. In Waters v. Lilley,53 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts noted that the right to fish on another's land, a right
claimed by custom, was a profit and not an easement, which would have
made it impossible to claim as a custom in England. A subsequent
Massachusetts case, however, confirmed the potential existence of
customary easements without specifically finding one in that case.54
Finally, in two New Hampshire cases, the state's high court initially
refused claims of customary rights to enter private property to carry
away sand and to collect seaweed, on the grounds that both were profits
to which the law of custom did not apply (forcing plaintiffs to rely upon
prescriptive rights).55 But the New Hampshire court eventually directly
acknowledged its implied recognition of the possibility of an easement
by custom in Knowles v. Dow.56 The court stated: "[Unexplained and
uncontradicted [testimony of usage for more than twenty years] is
sufficient to warrant a jury in finding the existence of an immemorial
custom."5 7
3. The Rebirth of Custom and Its Rise as a Potential Background
Principle
In the latter half of the twentieth century, United States state court
judges have been more receptive to the doctrine of custom than their
earlier brethren. Thus, in Idaho, the state's high court dearly recognized
that the law of custom had acceptance in the state, though it refused to
permit the establishment of a customary right unless all of Blackstone's
seven criteria were met.58 In Texas, the courts have upheld state
legislation purporting to simply restate existing customary rights to use
the beaches of the state, regardless of private "ownership."59 The most
far-reaching and significant treatments come from Oregon and Hawaii.
In Oregon, the courts "found" a customary right to traverse private sand
beaches without any fact-finding and have extended it to the entire
53 21 Mass. 145 (1826).
54 Jones v. Percival, 22 Mass. 485,486-87 (1827).
s5 Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524,527 (1845); Perley v. Langley, 7 N.H. 233,236-37 (1834).
- 22 N.H. 387,409 (1851).
7l d.
59 Idaho ex re Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Idaho 1979). The court found six of the
seven missing. Id. Additionally, the court further noted that over half a century of use was
not "time immemorial" for the purpose of custom. Id.
59 See Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957, 958 (rex. App. 1989), art. denied, 493 U.S. 1073
(1989); Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372 379-80 (rex. App. 1979); see also United States v. St.
Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772-73 (D.V.I. 1974), afd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d
Cir. 1974).
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Oregon coast on behalf of the public-at-large. Hawaiian courts, by
comparison, have ignored much of their own precedent on the rights of
native Hawaiians and extended undetermined rights of access, worship,
and gathering over much of the state.
The cases that established customary law and changed property
rights in Oregon were decided against a backdrop of legislation that
declared any easement that the public had in, or on, the beach was
vested in the state.60 In Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,61 the state sought
to prevent the landowners, the Hays, from constructing improvements
on the dry-sand beach portion of their lot between the high-water line
and the upland vegetation line based largely on theories of prescriptive
rights. The Hays appealed an adverse judgment below to the state
supreme court. Ignoring the grounds on which it was previously
decided, the Thornton court, sua sponte, decided the case on the basis of
custom, stating:
Because many elements of prescription are present in
this case, the state has relied upon the doctrine in
support of the decree below. We believe, however, that
there is a better legal basis for affirming the decree. The
most cogent basis for the decision in this case is the
English doctrine of custom. Strictly construed,
prescription applies only to the specific tract of land
before the court, and doubtful prescription cases could
fill the court for years with tract-by-tract litigation. An
established custom, on the other hand, can be proven
with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands from
the northern to the southern border of the state ought to
be treated uniformly.62
The court cited Blackstone as a basis for its decision and claimed that
the decision "meets every one of Blackstone's requirements."63 The
court, therefore, held that custom was a valid basis for allowing all the
citizens of the state to go upon all dry-sand areas along the Pacific coast
of Oregon, private or not.64 This decision resulted in the inability of
landowners in the affected areas to build anything that would obstruct
60 16 OR. REV. STAT. § 390.610 (1999).
61 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
62 Id. at 676.
63 Id. at 677.
Id. at 673.
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such access.65 The court was unmoved by claims of hardship, noting that
"[t]he rule in this case, based upon custom, is salutary in confirming a
public right, and at the same time it takes from no man anything which
he has had legitimate reason to regard as exclusively his."6 6
Twenty-five years later, the Oregon Supreme Court revisited
customary law in Stevens v. Cannon Beach,67 this time explicitly holding
custom to be a Lucas background principle of state law. There, the Town
of Cannon Beach refused to issue a seawall permit because it would
block access to the dry-sand beach in derogation of the customary public
rights established by Thornton. To the Stevens' Fifth Amendment takings
claim, the court responded that the customary law of Oregon was a
background principle under Lucas and, therefore, an exception to the
Lucas categorical rule governing takings of all economically beneficial
use.68 In both Thornton and Cannon Beach, therefore, the right to exclude
the public was never part of the landowners' titles. Of course, the court
does not say exactly when and how the Hays and other similarly
situated landowners were to apprehend that their dry-sand beach land
was subject to a customary easement given that they purchased the land
prior to Thornton.
Recent decisions in Hawaii have also recognized and expanded
customary rights, though the situation is more complex because some
tradition of customary rights exists, associated with native Hawaiians
from the days of the various kingdoms. This tradition predates not only
statehood, but also territorial days and annexation toward the end of the
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, for much of its history, the state's high
court issued opinions limiting the scope of native Hawaiian customary
rights. In the early case of Oni v. Meek,69 the Hawaii Supreme Court
rejected a claim of pasturage based on pre-1850 customary rights on the
ground that an 1850 statute, later codified in principle as Hawaii Revised
Statutes (H.R.S.) 7-1, enumerated all the rights that tenants had in lands
that they did not "own." A logical conclusion from this decision was
that all other rights - traditional, customary, and otherwise - were
terminated. 70
65 Id.
6 Id. at 678.
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 US. 1207 (1994).
68 Id. at 456.
6 2 Haw. 87 (1858).
70 See id. at 90. Of the asserted custom of pasturage, the court stated: "It is obvious to us
that the custom contended for is so unreasonable, so uncertain, and so repugnant to the
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Both before and after statehood, courts mainly limited customary
law in Hawaii to statutory rights to gather natural products listed in
H.R.S. 7-1. An attempt to expand such rights by the state supreme court,
by permitting Kamaaina testimony (verbal history by indigenous people)
to modify seaward land boundaries of private landowners," was
soundly rejected by the federal district court in Sotomura v. County of
Hawaii.72 Finding no credible evidence justifying relocation of the
seaward boundary, the court observed:
This Court fails to find any legal, historical, factual or
other precedent or basis for the conclusions of the
Hawaii Supreme Court that, following erosion, the
monument by which the seaward boundary of seashore
land in Hawaii is to be fixed is the upper reaches of the
waves. To the contrary, the evidence introduced in this
case firmly establishes that the common law, followed
by both legal precedent and historical practice, fixes the
high water mark and seaward boundaries with reference
to the tides, as opposed to the run or reach of waves on
the shore.73
The district court thus found that there was no evidence of the public use
that the state argued ripened into a customary right.
Almost twenty years after Sotomura, a sea change occurred when the
Hawaii Supreme Court declared in the 1995 case of Public Access
Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Commission74 (PAS-) that
traditional and customary rights of native Hawaiians may be practiced
on public and private land, both undeveloped and substantially
developed, anywhere in the state.75 The court also held that government
agencies must consider the effect on such customary rights in deciding
on applications for development permits. Claiming to build on previous
decisions first limiting rights to those enumerated in a statute,76 the court
suggested in dicta that courts could go beyond the statutory
enumeration on the ground of custom where the Hawaiian practice does
spirit of the present laws, that it ought not to be sustained by judicial authority." Id.; see
also Sullivan, supra note 10.
71 See Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968).
460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978).
7 Id. at 480.
74 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1163 (1996).
75 Id. at 1272.
76 See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982).
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no harm and can be demonstrably shown to be continued within a
certain land division. This extension is arguably contrary to the express
holding in Oni. The court later found such customary rights could, in
certain circumstances, be exercised outside such a land division if the
custom to do so is proven.
With respect to the potential conflict between the newly minted
customary rights regime and traditional property rights, the court
opined that Western notions of property law, particularly exclusivity,
might not be applicable in Hawaii, particularly when they collide with
custom: "[W]e hold that common law rights ordinarily associated with
tenancy do not limit customary rights existing under the laws of this
state."77 As to whether the "finding" of such rights in derogation of
fundamental "Western" concepts of property could be a taking of
property without compensation, best to let the court speak for itself:
[The property owner] argues that the recognition of
traditional Hawaiian rights beyond those established in
Kalipi and Pele would fundamentally alter its property
rights. However, [the property owner's] argument
places undue reliance on western understandings of property
law that are not universally applicable in Hawaii. Moreover,
Hawaiian custom and usage have always been a part of
the laws of this State. Therefore, our recognition of
customary and traditional Hawaiian rights... does not
constitute a judicial taking.78
The Hawaii Supreme Court recently clarified some of its PASH
conclusions in Hawaii v. Hanapi.79 Alapai Hanapi, a native Hawaiian,
was arrested for trespassing on the oceanfront land of his neighbor (a
well-known trial lawyer). The land was improved with a single-family
residence. The neighbor was engaged in removing illegally deposited
fill from the shore and water. Hanapi entered the property, without
permission, to "monitor" the subsequent restoration of the beach and
wetland, claiming he was exercising native Hawaiian rights. Hanapi had
initiated the original complaint against his neighbor partly on the basis
that the fill was adversely affecting native fishponds adjoining his
property, at which he and his family claimed to practice traditional
religious, gathering, and sustenance activities. When Hanapi refused to
77 PASH, 903 P.2d at 1269.
n Id. at 1272 (emphasis added).
79 970 P.2d 485 (Haw. 1998).
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leave, the foreman supervising the restoration called the police, and
Hanapi was arrested for criminal trespass. Hanapi, appearing pro se, was
convicted.
In sustaining Hanapi's conviction, the Hawaii Supreme Court
initially noted that one limitation on private property "would be that
constitutionally protected native Hawaiian rights, reasonably exercised,
qualify as a privilege for purposes of enforcing criminal trespass
statutes." 80 However, the court held that Hanapi had failed to establish,
as required, that his claimed native Hawaiian right was a customary and
traditional practice. The court set out three "factors" that Hanapi and
others claiming such rights are required to establish: first, qualify as a
native Hawaiian within the PASH guidelines (descendents of native
Hawaiians who inhabited the islands prior to 1778); second, establish
that his or her claimed right is constitutionally protected as a customary
or traditional native Hawaiian practice (however, it need not be
enumerated in a statute or constitution); and third, demonstrate that
exercise of the right occurred on undeveloped or less than fully
developed property (not further defined in PASH).s' In applying these
factors to Hanapi, the court held that if property is zoned and used for
residential purposes with existing dwellings, improvements, and
infrastructure, it is "always inconsistent" to permit the practice of
traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights on such property.
Indeed, the court additionally noted that "[tjhere may be other examples
of 'fully developed' property as well where the existing uses of the
property may be inconsistent with the exercise of protected native
Hawaiian rights."8
Hanapi represents a retreat from the broader language in PASH, but
it is a relatively minor one. In Hawaii, as in Oregon and a few other
states, the doctrine is generally on the rise. Further, though it is not
always expressed in such terms, customary law is posed as a defense to
the categorical takings rule announced in Lucas and takings claims in
general by way of the Lucas background principles exception. Custom is
not, however, the only common law doctrine that is being thrust forward
to give meaning to the otherwise vague background principles concept.
80 Id. at492.
m Id. at 494.
82 Id. at 495 n.10.
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C. The Public Trust
Broadly stated, the public trust doctrine provides that a state holds
public trust lands, waters, and resources for the benefit of its citizens,
establishing the right of the public to fully enjoy them for a variety of
public uses and purposes.8 Implied in this definition are limitations on
the private use of such waters and lands, as well as limitations on the
ability of the state to transfer interests in them, particularly if such
transfer will prevent public use. Such definitions and duties flow from
the dual nature of title in public trust lands and waters. On the one
hand, the public has the right to use and enjoy the land and water - the
res of the trust - for purposes such as commerce, navigation, fishing,
bathing, and related activities. This is the so-called jus publicum. On the
other hand, since fully one-third of public trust property is in private
rather than public hands, private property rights also exist in many such
lands and waters.84 This is called the jus privatum.85  The principal
problem is, of course, the extent to which the public trust doctrine can
eliminate private property rights without Fifth Amendment
compensation.
1. The Origins of the Modem Public Trust Doctrine
The undisputed source of the modem public trust doctrine is Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.86 The railroad claimed title to 1000 acres of
submerged lands under Lake Michigan, stretching for nearly a mile
along Chicago's shoreline, which it proposed to fill and develop. The
railroad obtained title under a specific fee simple grant from the Illinois
legislature. Finding that navigable waters and lands under them were
held by the state in trust for the public, the United States Supreme Court
held that the state could not convey or otherwise alienate them in fee
simple, free of the public trust. The state could, however, sell small
parcels of public trust land, the use of which would promote the public
interest (e.g., docks, piers, and wharves), so long as this could be done
without impairing the public's right to make use of the remaining
submerged land and water.8
83 COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., PtflTING THE PuBLIc TRUST DocTRInE TO WORK 1 (2d ed.
1997) [hereinafter COASTAL STATES].
'" COASTAL STATES, supra note 83, at 230.
COASTAL STATES, supra note 83, at 1.
146 Us. 387 (1892).
'7 Id. at 450-64.
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Because the Illinois legislature conveyed the land in fee simple in
apparent disregard of the public trust, the sale was void. The case now
stands for the proposition that only the jus privatum, as compared with
the jus publicum, can be transferred by the state and that, inversely, the
jus publicum can never be part of a private title to trust lands. An
example of the type of private use that is permissible under the doctrine
comes from Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club,
Inc.88 There, the Idaho Supreme Court approved a lease of state lands
impressed with the trust to a private club for the construction,
maintenance, and use of private dock facilities on a bay in a navigable
lake. The court specifically held that the lease (not a fee simple transfer)
was not incompatible with the public trust imposed on the property "at
this time."89
Nearly a century after Illinois Central, the United States Supreme
Court expanded the reach of the public trust doctrine from submerged
lands to all lands under waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the
tides in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi.90 In so doing, the Court
rejected private fee simple titles extending back to pre-statehood Spanish
land grantees that were held by Phillips and its predecessors for over one
hundred years and upon which the company had paid taxes as if held in
fee simple. Instead, the Court held that title to these lands, which were
often exposed for long periods of time, passed to the State of Mississippi
upon its entry into the union under the "equal footing" doctrine.9'
According to the Court, "[s]tates have the authority to define the limits
of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such
lands as they see fit."92
A strong three-justice dissent, comprised of Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Stevens, expressed alarm that the Court's holding will
"disrupt the settled expectations of landowners not only in Mississippi
but in every coastal State."93 By substantially expanding traditional
public trust rights beyond navigable waters and bays immediately
adjoining them, the decision, argued the dissent, would extend the
state's public trust interests to tidal, non-navigable waters, including
bodies remote and only indirectly connected to the ocean or navigable
* 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
9 Id. at 1094.
w 484 US. 469 0988).
W Id. at 479-82
92 Id. at 475.
93 Id. at 485 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tidal waters. The practical effect was that thousands of leaseholders of
tidal lands could be displaced because over nine million acres of land
were classified as fresh or saline wetlands, arguably now subject to the
state's control under the public trust doctrine.94
2. Recent Expansions of the Trust Doctrine: Selected State Cases
In the last thirty years, many state courts have expanded the
geographical reach and substantive scope of the public trust doctrine. In
particular, a spate of recent decisions have extended it to cover resources
beyond navigable waterways, while also finding that the trust protects
public uses in such resources other than the traditional triad of
commerce, navigation, and fishing. This trend has precipitated a
collision between the newfound rights of the public under the trust
doctrine and private rights traditionally flowing from private property.
Significantly, many courts have rejected the takings claims resulting
from this collision.
Perhaps the most far-reaching extensions of the public trust doctrine
come from the Hawaii Supreme Court. In In re Water Use Permit
Applications,95 the court impressed a broad version of the public trust
onto the state's fresh water supply, rewriting Hawaii's legislatively
crafted water code and ignoring precedent that limited the role of the
public trust in the state's water regime. Finding a distinct public trust
encompassing all the water resources of the state, the court held that
"resource protection" was a protected public trust use of such resources.
It concluded that the state's water commission was bound by an
"affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning
and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses
whenever feasible."9 6 Given the "distinct" nature of the Hawaii public
trust doctrine, this meant that "any balancing between public and
private purposes begins with a presumption in favor of public use,
access, and enjoyment."97
The court found a basis for its expansive interpretation and
application of the trust doctrine to non-navigable Hawaiian waters in
Article XI, Section 1, of the Hawaii Constitution, which provides:
m Id. at 493-94.
9 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
9 Id. at 453 (quoting Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 728
(1983)).
97 Id. at 454.
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For the benefit of present and future generations, the
State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and
protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural
resources, including land, water, air, minerals, and
energy sources, and shall promote the development and
utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with
their conservation and in furtherance of the self-
sufficiency of the State.98
Section 1 further mandates that "all public natural resources are held in
trust by the State for the benefit of the people."99 In the court's view,
these statements "adopt the public trust doctrine as a fundamental
principle of constitutional law in Hawaii,"100 and, therefore, prohibit any
derogation from the trust through statutory law. Significantly, the court
refused to "define the full extent of Article XI, section l's reference to 'all
public resources,"' 101 arguably leaving open the possibility of further
extensions of the physical reach of the doctrine in Hawaii.
In response to a takings objection initiated by private Hawaiian
interests concerned that the public trust-based water regime prevented
them from utilizing ground water traditionally considered private
property, the court stated:
[T~he reserved sovereign prerogatives over the waters of
the state precludes the assertion of vested rights to water
contrary to public trust purposes. This restriction
preceded the formation of property rights in this
jurisdiction; in other words, the right to absolute
ownership of water exclusive of the public trust never
accompanied the "bundle of rights" conferred in the
Mdhele1 02
Since the "original limitation of the public trust defeats [the plaintiffs]
claims of absolute entitlement to water," there could be no
unconstitutional taking.1 3 The court's implicit recognition of its public
trust doctrine as a background principle is unmistakable, if unspoken.
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
'9 id.
10D In re Water Use Permit Application. 9 P.3d 409,444 (Haw. 2000).
Im Id. at 445.
102 Id. at 494.
103 Id.
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The extension of the public trust in Hawaii built upon an earlier
water rights case out of California, National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court of Alpine County.0 4 In that case, the California Supreme Court
impressed the state's public trust doctrine to non-navigable tributaries of
Mono Lake. The court also dismissed the ensuing takings claim, stating:
Once again we rejected the claim that establishment of
the public trust constituted a taking of property for
which compensation was required: "We do not divest
anyone of title to property; the consequence of our
decision will be only that some landowners whose
predecessors in interest acquired property under the
1870 act will, like the grantees in [People v.] California
Fish, [166 Cal. 576 (Cal. 1913),] hold it subject to the
public trust.105
A more recent Wisconsin court decision followed the same path. In
R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin,10 6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
the denial of a state fill permit to complete the last phase of a lakeside
marina. In upholding the decision of a state agency to thus protect an
"emergent weedbed" that literally surfaced during (and due to)
construction of the earlier phases of the project, the court held that the
public trust doctrine required state ownership of the subject property,
leaving the landowner with riparian rights of use and access only,
subject to the public's "superior rights."
Expansions of the public trust have not been limited to water
resources. In New Jersey, for instance, courts have expanded the reach
of the doctrine to dry-sand areas, in much the same way as the Oregon
courts did in Thornton and Cannon Beach, but this time relying on the
public trust instead of custom.1 7 The most well-known example is
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 06 in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine extends to dry-sand
beach areas for both access to and limited use of the ocean and foreshore
(traditional trust areas):
1-i 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
"0s Id. at 723.
1i 628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001).
107 See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); Lusardi v.
Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1981); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal,
393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978); Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 372 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 1977).
M0 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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The bather's right in the upland sands is not limited to
passage. Reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the
sea cannot be realized unless some enjoyment of the dry
sand area is also allowed. The complete pleasure of
swimming must be accompanied by intermittent periods
of rest and relaxation beyond the water's edge.... The
unavailability of the physical situs for such rest and
relaxation would seriously curtail and in many
situations eliminate the right to the recreational use of
the ocean . . . where use of dry sand is essential or
reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the ocean, the
[public trust] doctrine warrants the public's use of the
upland dry sand area subject to an accommodation of
the interests of the owner.1°9
Although Matthews did not consider the takings issue, the question
arose in a more recent attempt by the State of New Jersey to secure
public access to the Hudson River across non-trust lands.1 0 In National
Ass'n of Home Builders v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection,"' the court considered whether a taking arose from a state law
requiring landowners to permit a public path along a 17.4-mile long
piece of land bordering the river, 11.3% of which was "non-public trust
property." Reaffirming the vitality of Matthews, the federal district court
concluded that the Matthews "reasonableness" test,"2 rather than the
stricter federal standards enunciated in Dolan v. City of Tigard,'l'
governed the takings claim.114
The Washington Supreme Court applied the state's public trust
doctrine to privately held tidelands, part of which were no longer under
water, in Orion Corp. v. Washington."5 There, the landowner planned to
build a residential community on dredged and filled tidelands and other
submerged lands. However, after the land was purchased, the state
adopted a series of coastal and tideland laws limiting the landowner's
109 Id. at 365.
110 See Nat'I Ass'n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J.
1999).
1 64 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999).
112 See id. at 359-60.
11 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
114 Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 359. Specifically, the court remanded the
case for examination of the following factors: "1) location of the [private] dry sand area in
relation to the foreshore; 2) extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area; 3)
nature and extent of the public demand; and 4) usage of the upland area by the owner." Id.
115 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 486 US. 1022 (1988).
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use to recreation and aquaculture. The landowner claimed that the
restrictions amounted to a regulatory taking. The Orion court applied
the then-current federal takings test set out in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York" 6 and held that Orion could have no investment-backed
expectations for development. Specifically, it stated that, because the
state held original title to all of Washington's shoreline, any transfer of
shoreline property was impressed with the public trust doctrine, which
was inalienable. The court did note that the state's restrictions were
more prohibitive than would result from a reasonable application of the
public trust doctrine. Therefore, to the extent the regulations only
prohibited uses that would be prohibited under the public trust, no
taking could occur. On the other hand, to the extent the regulations were
more restrictive, a regulatory taking could occur if they denied all
economically viable use.
IIm. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE PARAMETERS OF THE PRINCIPLES
The notion that pre-existing statutes are background principles per
se has always been troublesome, but in the aftermath of Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,117 it is an impossible position to maintain. With respect to
traditional public trust and custom, there is much to be said in favor of
their apparent status as "background principles." Significant difficulties
arise, however, in categorically characterizing each of these concepts as
Lucas exceptions, at least as they are currently applied. The following
Subparts critique the courts' use of statutory law, custom, and public
trust, suggesting that conceptual modifications are required if the
emerging law of background principles is to retain logical and
precedential consistency.
A. The Limits of Statutory Law
1. Lucas's Emphasis on the Common Law
In contrast to the lower courts' eager adoption of statutes as
"background principles," the Lucas Court itself leaned heavily toward
the common law when discussing the meaning of the background
principles exception. Most significantly, the Court stressed that land use
restrictions that deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use of
land cannot be "newly decreed or legislated," stating:
116 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
117 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
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A law or decree with such an effect must, in other
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could
have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under
the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under
its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally, or otherwise.118
Thus, the only concrete examples of property rules that the Court
sanctioned as outside the categorical takings rule were. nuisance
principles that clearly emanate from the common law.11 9 Furthermore, in
detailing the circumstances in which the principles could be applied to
defeat a takings claim, the Court stated that "[t]he fact that a particular
use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily
imports a lack of any common-law prohibition." 12° Finally, the dissenting
Justices clearly understood that the majority opinion limited background
principles to common law principles, stating: "The Court's holding
today effectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legislature
much of its traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and
uses of property."'2 Lower state and federal courts have, of course,
interpreted the Lucas majority opinion as quite a bit less restrictive than
either the majority or dissenting Justices intended.
2. Palazzolo and the "New" Role of Statutory Law
The recent case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island"22 sheds some light on the
background principles question, making it clear that an otherwise
unconstitutional regulation (absent compensation) does not become a
background principle merely because it precedes the current owner's
acquisition of title. The decision failed, however, to close the door on the
notion that a statute may become such a principle at some point. If
Palazzolo can be read to give any support to the statutory background
principles concept, the decision departs from the more traditional view
that statutes are, by nature, not background principles, as Justice Scalia
clearly implied in Lucas.
Is Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1029 (1992).
119 See id.
120 Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
M- 121 S. Ct 2448 (2001).
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a. Mere Passage of Time Does Not Convert a Statute into a Background
Principle of a State's Law of Property
As the Court observed, "[tihe first holding [of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court] was couched in terms of background principles of state
property law." 12 That is, the state court decided that the coastal
protection statute at issue in the case was a background principle, so that
even if the regulatory effect was to deprive Palazzolo of all economically
beneficial use, Palazzolo was entitled to no relief because the statute fell
within the Lucas exception for state background principles of property
law.
In addressing the Rhode Island court's initial holding, the Palazzolo
Court reviewed the pertinent parts of its landmark Lucas decision:
In Lucas the Court observed that a landowner's ability to
recover for a government deprivation of all
economically beneficial use of property is not absolute
but instead is confined by limitations on the use of land
which "inhere in the title itself." This is so, the Court
reasoned, because the landowner is constrained by those
"restrictions that background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership." It is asserted here that Lucas stands for the
proposition that any new regulation, once enacted,
becomes a background principle of property law which
cannot be challenged by those who acquire title after the
enactment.124
Having set out the rules for the background principles exception, the
Palazzolo Court proceeded to put its own mark on the concept: "It
suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional
absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of
the State's law by mere virtue of the passage of title."125 The Court then
reinforced the limits on statutory enactments as background principles
as described in Lucas:
This relative standard would be incompatible with our
description of the concept in Lucas, which is explained in
123 Id. at 2462.
124 Id. at 2464 (citations omitted).
1,5 Id.
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terms of those common, shared understandings of
permissible limitations derived from a State's legal
tradition. A regulation or common-law rule cannot be a
background principle for some owners but not for
others. The determination whether an existing, general
law can limit all economic use of property must turn on
objective factors, such as the nature of the land use
proscribed. A law does not become a background
principle for subsequent owners by enactment itself.12
b. Common Law Codification Statutes as Background Principles
Exceptions
Given the foregoing statements from Palazzolo, cases such as Bell that
reject takings claims because of pre-existing statutes must be considered
wrongly decided, at least to the extent they purport to be based upon the
background principles exception to the Lucas per se rule. In fact, if the
Court had said nothing more, one would be left with the clear
impression that statutory enactments can never represent background
principles. However, the Court preceded its application of the
background principles concept to the relevant statute in this case with
the following enigmatic statement- "We have no occasion to consider the
precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a
background principle of state law or whether those circumstances are
present here."27
Does this mean that there are circumstances when such an
enactment can be a background principle, insulating the regulating
government from the Lucas categorical rule with respect to total
regulatory takings? Consider that the Court has, in the same paragraph:
first, refused to confer background principle status on the Rhode Island
statute that was so characterized by that state's highest court and,
second, reiterated the Lucas concept of background principles as
"common, shared understandings of permissible limitations derived
from a State's legal tradition."128 There is a way to resolve the Court's
seemingly conflicting statements on background principles: a statute is a
background principle of a state's law of property if, and only if, it
126 Id. (citations omitted).
127 Id.
'2 Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464.
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codifies or embodies a common-law rule that is "shared" by all of the
citizens of the state.1'2
The common law doctrines of custom and public trust may well be
examples of such rules, so long as they are not suddenly discovered and
applied as self-serving rationales to save an otherwise illegal regulatory
taking but are truly long and well established. 13 By way of analogy, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Bell v. Town of Wells"' recently
observed that a statute conferring rights on all of a state's citizens to
cross private dry-sand beach in order to reach public trust waters and
adjacent beaches for recreation can be defended against a regulatory
taking challenge only if the statute embodies public rights already
available under the said public trust doctrine. To the extent that the
statute attempts to confer additional rights on citizens to cross private
property without the permission of the affected landowners, the state
exceeds its authority and must compensate the private owner for such
intrusions. 32
3. The Recognition of Statutory Background Principles Infects the
Categorical Takings Rule with a Partial Takings Standard
The notion that pre-existing statutes defeat a takings claim must be
discarded not only because it ignores the Court's characterization of
background principles in Lucas and Palazzolo, but also because it engrafts
a general regulatory takings standard onto the unique and inflexible
categorical rule. Specifically, the statutory background principles trend
borrows the notice rule from the modem doctrine of "reasonable
investment-backed expectations," which has been held irrelevant to the
economically beneficial use standard applied to total or per se takings.133
'2 See Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L
& PUB. POL'Y 147,152 (1995) (stating that Lucas "accepted the property definition implicit in
state common law, while rejecting (or at least limiting) its redefinition by state or local
legislation").
130 See generally Callies, supra note 10, at 10003.
131 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
13 See Purdie v. Att'y Gen., 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999); Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604
(N.11 1994).
'33 See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The court held:
In the initial analysis of whether a takings has occurred, when it is
determined that the effect of the regulatory imposition is to eliminate
all economically viability of the property alleged to have been taken,
the owner's expectations regarding future use of the property are not a
factor in deciding whether the imposition requires a remedy.
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In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,134 the Court
established the "ad-hoc inquiry" for regulatory takings claims. This
inquiry focuses on three factors, with specific emphasis placed on the
extent to which a regulation interferes with a landowner's investment-
backed expectations. 13 In the last decade, courts have applied the
concept of investment-backed expectations by asking whether the
claimant's property is restricted pursuant to regulations that predate the
purchase of property. If the answer is yes, the constructive notice
implicit in the pre-existing regulations is said to preclude the formation
of "reasonable" investment-backed expectations, and therefore, defeats
the claim.13
As acknowledged by the Court of Federal Claims in Forest Properties,
Inc. v. United States,13 and implicitly recognized in several recent
federal 38 and state cases, 139 an application of the background principles
concept that includes statutes conflates the Lucas exception with the
notice-based expectations doctrine.140  Both concepts preclude
landowners from establishing a taking when regulation predates the
Id. (footnote omitted).
1- 438 US. 104 (1978).
13 Id. at 124. The other factors were, of course, the economic impact of the regulation and
the "character of the governmental action." Id.
136 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Invesbnent-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URB. LAW.
215, 244-45 (1995) (reviewing cases in which landowner expectations are undermined by
constructive notice of regulation).
137 39 Fed. C. 56 (Fed. C1. 1997).
'3 See Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d
275, 287 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding land development rules at time of purchase established
that property owner did not have either expectations or property interests sufficient to
establish a takings claim); Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, 694
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding landowner did not have a protected property interest in
maintaining billboards as a nonconforming use because he had no expectation of the use in
light of pre-existing restrictions).
139 See Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envt. Conservation, 679 N.E2d 1035,1041 (N.Y. 1997)
(holding that pre-existing wetlands statute undermined expectations and operated as a
background principle); Accord Agric. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, No. 03-
98-00340-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LE)IS 6898, at *13 (rex. Ct App. Sept. 10, 1999) (citing Lucas
for the proposition that "owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by uses permitted by
state law"); Hansen v. Snohomish County, No. 43463-1-I, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 1915, at
*7 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 8,1999) (citing the Lucas Court's background principles discussion
for the conclusion that, under existing zoning, landowners had no "rightful" expectation in
commercial development).
140 Forest Props., Inc., 39 Fed. CL. at 71; see Radford & Breemer, supra note 9 (discussing the
conflation of background principles and "reasonable investment-backed expectations").
2002] TRENDS IN TAKINGS LAW 367
purchase of property.141 In Gazza v. New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation,142 this conflation was clearly evident when
the New York Court of Appeals held that, in light of pre-existing
wetlands regulations, a landowner "never owned an absolute right to
build on his land without a variance," 143 and, in the alternative, that his
"reasonable expectations were not affected when the property remained
restricted." 144
The problem is that the circumstances under which a landowner
acquires land (and, thus, the notice rule) may be "keenly relevant to
takings law generally" but are inapposite to Lucas cases where a
landowner is denied all economically viable use. This was made
abundantly clear in Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States.14 In Palm
Beach Isles, a group of investors (PBIA) bought a 311.7-acre parcel of
property in 1956, 50.7 acres of which was inundated with wetlands or
submerged under shallow water. 46  After years of negotiation with
government authorities, the Army Corps of Engineers rejected PBIA's
application for a fill permit "on environmental grounds and the
requirements of the Clean Water Act," 47 which was enacted in 1971,
long after the property was earmarked for development. The Court of
Federal Claims rejected the ensuing takings claim, in part because "the
existing statutory regime precluded any reasonable investment-backed
expectation of being able to develop the property." 4 8
141 See Sugameli, supra note 12, at 979 (noting that courts reject takings claims on the basis
of pre-existing statutes under the background principles exception and the reasonable
expectations doctrine).
142 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997).
143 Id. at 1040. Observing that " [t]he relevant property interests owned by the petitioner are
defined by those State laws enacted and in effect at the time he took title," the court
concluded that "the only permissible uses for the subject property were dependent upon
those [wetlands] regulations." Id.
144 Id. at 1043. The court explained that reasonable expectations are "examined in light of
the level of interference with permissible uses of the land by the subject regulation." Id. at
1042 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US. 104,136 (1978)).
M 208 F3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
14% Id. at 1377. The 261-acre and 50.7-acre parcels were split by a road. Id. Of the 50.7
acres, 1.4 acres was "shoreline wetlands adjacent to the road, and 49.3 acres [was]
submerged land adjacent to the wetlands." Id.
147 Id. at 1378. The Corps also considered the effect of PBIA's application on navigation,
but concluded that "the project should not have a significant adverse effect on navigation,
in general." Id.
148 Id. at 1379. The Court of Federal Claims also held that there was no taking of the
submerged 49.3-acre parcel because it was subject to a federal navigational servitude that
was a "pre-existing limitation upon the landowner's title." Id. at 1378. The court
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the reasonable
investment-backed expectations factor and, thus, the nature of the
underlying regulatory regime were irrelevant to a denial of all economic
use claims.149 Then, in rejecting a petition for a rehearing by the panel en
banc, the original panel issued a supplemental opinion'50 that
exhaustively reviewed Lucas and emphatically concluded that
landowner expectations and, therefore, regulatory regimes predating the
acquisition or attempted development of land are irrelevant to total
takings: "When the government seizes the entire estate for government
purposes, whether by physical occupation or categorical regulatory
taking, it is not necessary to explore what those [landowner]
expectations may have been."151 The court continued:
This does not mean that use restrictions are irrelevant to
the takings calculus, even in categorical takings cases.
Once a taking has been found, the use restrictions on the
property are one of the factors that are taken into
account in determining damages due the owner. It does
mean that in the initial analysis of whether a taking has
occurred, when it is determined that the effect of the
regulatory imposition is to eliminate all economic
viability of the property alleged to have been taken, the
owner's expectations regarding future use of the
property are not a factor in deciding whether the
imposition requires a remedy.' 2
Or, as another court put it, "[tihe [expectations] concept is useless where
... the alleged taking is categorical, i.e., physical or involves the denial
of all economically viable uses of the property."'m It is not surprising
then that Palazzolo jettisoned the expectations/notice rule from the per se
concluded that this limitation meant that "the proscribed use interests were not part of the
owner's title to begin with." Id.
149 Id. at 1379. In reaching the conclusion that expectations are irrelevant to a Lucas claim,
the court relied on an early post-Lucas Federal Circuit decision, Florida Rock Industries v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Id. It noted that Good v. United States, 189 F.3d
1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999), appeared to arrive at the contrary conclusion but concluded that
statements of takings law after Florida Rock "cannot, of course, change the law (absent a
decision en banc), under the doctrine of South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1982)." Id. at 1379 n.3.
150 Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc).
151 Id. at 1363.
152 Id. at 1363-64 (citation omitted).
'93 Ultimate Sportsbar Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. C1. 540,547 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
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takings standard by returning the background principles concept to the
common law limits established in Lucas.
B. The Limits of Custom and the Public Trust
If otherwise confiscatory regulations avoid the compensation
requirement as should common law limitations, traditional custom and
public trust are clearly appropriate candidates for identification as
categorical takings exceptions. Public rights emanating from these
doctrines stand on a footing similar to an easement, leasehold, covenant
burden, license, or other recognized private property right in the land of
another: a limitation or restriction on the title of and, usually, use by the
landowner. Yet, the same legal tradition that thrusts these rights
forward also hinges their applicability as background principles on the
existence of several prerequisites.
1. Custom Must Be Returned to the Blackstonian Framework
It may very well be possible to interpret the common law of the
several states (particularly that of Hawaii) to create rights of access in
land without reference to Blackstonian custom (though it is doubtful
such creativity could withstand federal takings scrutiny), but the fact
remains that courts do not. Instead, Blackstonian custom becomes the
ultimate bedrock, the last defense, of each decision. One suspects that
the courts understand they are on thin ice in breaching the fundamental
right to exclude others from private property.15 4 Though they are to be
commended for attempting to ground such a breach in the valid doctrine
of custom, the courts' application of, and reliance on, Blackstone leaves
much to be desired.
As we have seen, for a valid custom to exist it must be immemorial,
continuous, peaceable, reasonable, certain, compulsory, and consistent.
It is these criteria, applicable to a particular custom (land rights in
derogation of common law specific to a particular and limited
jurisdiction and definite population) that courts have dealt with and that
still form the basis for discussion and categorization of customary law.155
Unfortunately, while courts that find customary rights have gone
through the motions of considering these criteria, they have also, for the
most part, failed to apply all of them or to apply them in the sense they
14 See generally Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); David L Callies & J.
David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property: A Fundamental
Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. UNIV. J.L & POL'Y 39 (2000).
'5s See generally LAwS OF ENGLAND, supra note 46.
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were intended.156 Thus, in Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,57 the Oregon
Supreme Court attempted to apply Blackstone's criteria but mistook the
critical requirements of reasonableness and certainty. The court stated:
The fourth requirement, that of reasonableness, is
satisfied by the evidence that the public has always
made use of the land in a manner appropriate to the
land and to the usages of the community.... The fifth
requirement, certainty, is satisfied by the visible
boundaries of the dry-sand area and by the character of
the land, which limits that use thereof to recreational
uses connected with the foreshore.158
This is not, by any means, what Blackstone meant, nor did cases
before, contemporary with, or after his time support such an
interpretation. Rather, English cases from Blackstone's time (which
presumably he had in mind when writing the Commentaries), and those
soon after, measure the reasonableness of a custom by gauging its impact
on private property rights. Thus, one of the most common bases for
declaring a custom unreasonable - and these outnumber the reasonable
cases by a fair margin - is that the custom had an unusually burdensome
effect on the land over, or upon which, it is exercised.159 Certainty, on
the other hand, was comprised of three distinct components: certainty of
practice, certainty of locale, and certainty of persons. With respect to the
latter two, English cases consistently held that when a specific customary
practice is established, certainty requires limitation to a particular place
15 In the United States, some of the criteria - such as immemoriality as Blackstone would
define it - must be, and have been, modified to fit a country whose common-law
experience makes the application of certain criteria difficulL Historical distinctions cannot,
however, justify the alterations to Blackstonian "reasonableness" and "certainty" advanced
by the Oregon and Hawaii courts.
1- 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
158 Id. at 677.
15 See Broadbent v. Wilkes, Wiles 360, 125 Eng. Rep. 1214 (KB. 1742) (rejecting as
unreasonable alleged customary right of land tenants to sink pits and mine coal beneath
the lands of other tenants because it would "deprive the tenant of the whole benefit of the
land"); see also Bastard v. Smith, 2 M & Rob 129,174 Eng. Rep. 238 (Q.B. 1837) (instructing a
jury that it could not sanction the reasonableness of an alleged customary right of tin
miners to direct water into their mines "unless you find repeated acts of exercise of the
custom on the one hand, and of acquiescence on the other"); Wilkes v. Broadbent, 2 Strange
1224, Eng. Rep. 1145 (KB. 1745) (upholding Broadbent with particular emphasis on the great
burden on private land). See generally Mercer v. Denne, 2 Ch. 534 (1904), affid, 2 Ch. 538
(Eng. C.A. 1905) (upholding custom of fishermen to use a piece of land covered with a
shingle to spread and dry their nets "so long as they do not thereby throw an unreasonable
burden on the landowner").
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or locale, like a county, parish, or village (otherwise, it approaches the
general application and usage that is the hallmark of the common law)
and exercise by "individuals of a particular description."160 It was
inconceivable that "all the inhabitants of England" could exercise a
custom.
In light of the traditional criteria for custom, the Thornton court
adopted a version of customary law utterly disconnected from the
Blackstonian concept. In particular, by failing to consider the impact of
the customary beach use on private property and by eagerly extending
customary beach rights to all Oregonians on all parts of the coast, the
court applied standards of reasonableness and certainty that cannot be
attributed to Blackstone, though that is exactly what the court did.
Indeed, since reasonableness is not a matter of present use but of original
legal fairness, the court's statement that reasonableness "is satisfied by
the evidence that the public has always made use of the land in a manner
appropriate to the land and to the usages of the community"161 is beside
the point and irrelevant.
The Oregon court is not alone in misapplying Blackstone's criteria.
In PASH, the Hawaii Supreme Court also chose among elements of
traditional custom and similarly misapplied the elements of certainty
and reasonableness. In "finding" customary rights in twenty percent of
Hawaii's citizens over every square foot of land in the state, whether or
not developed, and with scant regard for the impact of the rights on
private landowners, the Hawaii court followed firmly in the footsteps of
Thornton, not those of Blackstone.
Therefore, while custom may indeed be a background principle as a
general matter, it is critical that courts comply with specific and certain
criteria when relying on customary rights as a takings exception.
Blackstone provided such criteria, not only as a matter of reason, but also
as a matter of law, as he is almost always cited in the reported American
16 Parker v. Combleford, Cro. Eliz. 726, 78 Eng. Rep. 959 (KB. 1599) (rejecting custom of
lord of a manor to take the best beast of any person dying within the manor as a tribute of
goods and chattels payable to the lord at death because the custom was thus extended to
those living outside the geographical area of the manor); see Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod.
148, 88 Eng. Rep. 957 (C.P. 1709) (stating that "the law allows usage in particular places to
supercede the common law, and it is the local law, which is never to be extended further
than the usage and practice, which is the only thing that makes it law"); see also Anglo-
Hellenic S.S. Co. v. Louis Dreyfus & Co., 108 L.T.R. 36 (KB. 1913) (stating that a custom is
only good because it "is in effect the common law within that place to which it extends,
although contrary to the law of the realm") (emphasis added).
161 Thonaton, 462 P.2d at 677.
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cases on custom and customary law. Unfortunately, up to this point the
modem doctrine of custom bears little resemblance to Blackstone's law
of custom. If it remains unrestrained by those traditional bonds, this
"background principle" could completely swallow important and
historical private rights in land, including the fundamental right to
exclude others from private property.
2. The Public Trust Should Be Restricted to Its Traditional Scope
When presented in traditional terms, as a state-controlled public
easement over tidal waters and their lands, it is increasingly clear that
the public trust is a "background principle." This is not surprising given
that the tidal public trust is a "settled rule of law"162 and, therefore, part
of "existing rules and understandings" 163 that comprise "background
principles." 164 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has explicitly recognized that
the federal navigation servitude - the federal expression of the public
trust1 65 - is a background principle under Lucas.166 It is fair to say that
states can, therefore, prohibit land uses inconsistent with the traditional
public trust without paying just compensation. 167 The problem is that
there is no uniform public trust doctrine and often no clear doctrinal
limits. Thus, as we have seen, the takings issue frequently arises in the
context of the public trust when a state court or legislature extends the
public's trust "rights" on private property. This occurs when a state:
162 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,474 (1988). The Court stated:
[I]t is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute property in, and
dominion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide waters in the
original States were reserved to the several States, and that the new
States since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and
jurisdiction in that behalf as the original States possess within their
respective borders.
Id. (citation omitted).
163 Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In that case, the Court
concluded that "property" is defined for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment by "existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id.
164 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1030 (1992).
16s See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L REV. 631, 636-37 (1986).
166 Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The court
stated, "[i]n light of our understanding of Lucas and other cases we have considered, we
hold that the navigational servitude may constitute part of the background principles to
which a property owner's rights are subject, and thus may provide the Government with a
defense to a takings claim." Id.
167 See, e.g., Lechuza Villas W. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 418 (Cal. CL
App. 1997) (holding that the Coastal Commission could rely on the public trust to prohibit
coastal development that intrudes into areas below the high-water mark without causing a
taking).
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first, imposes restrictions on privately held trust lands; second, requires
public access across private land for access to trust lands or water; and
third, expands the scope of public activities permitted under the guise of
public trust rights.168 The critical public trust question is how far courts
can go in redefining the doctrine at the expense of private property
rights while still escaping the just compensation requirement.
It is difficult to identify a bright line beyond which interferences
with private property can no longer be legitimately premised upon the
public trust doctrine. However, with some certainty, one can say that
the fit between the public trust and the background principles exception
fades as the doctrine drifts from its historical moorings. In contrast to
most customary law cases, state courts are often reluctant to reject
takings claims simply because a land use restriction is premised on an
expanded version of the public trust doctrine.169 For instance, in Bell v.
Town of Wells,170 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that an attempt
to expand the state's public trust doctrine to allow the public to traverse
private lands to reach public land for recreational purposes resulted in a
taking of private property. In the court's view, traditional and
permissible access purposes were limited to fishing, fowling, and
navigation. To the same effect is the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's decision in Opinion of the Justices.17 There, the court refused to
expand statutory declarations of public trust to permit so much as access
across private land to reach intertidal lands. In holding the proposal to
reserve such rights-of-way a probable taking, the court stated:
The permanent physical intrusion into the property of
private persons, which the bill would establish, is a
taking of property within even the most narrow
construction of that phrase possible under the
168 See generally DAVID L CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE: WHY REGULATION WON'T WORK,
101-02 (1994).
169 See Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 89 N.Y.2d 472 (1997) (refusing to extend the
public trust to waters not navigable in fact because it would "precipitate serious
destabilizing effects on property ownership principles and precedents"); W.J.F. Realty
Corp. v. New York, 672 N.YS.2d 1007,1010 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that the Long Island
Pine Barrens Protection Act which was premised on a form of the public trust, was
constitutional because it provided a mechanism for compensating property owners whose
use of land was restricted under the Act); see also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me.
1989) (holding that an act allowing public recreation on private intertidal lands amounted
to a taking); Purdie v. Att'y Gen., 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999) (holding that a legislative
extension of the public trust to dry-sand areas would cause a taking).
170 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
171 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974).
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Constitution of the Commonwealth and of the United
States. ... The interference with private property here
involves a wholesale denial of an owner's right to
exclude the public. If a possessory interest in real
property has any meaning at all it must include the
general right to exclude others. 172
Several opinions of the New Hampshire Supreme Court exhibit
similar skepticism toward expansions of the public trust that intrude on
private property. In Opinion of the Justices,173 the court responded to a
new statute that provided for access to tide-flowed public trust shoreline
across abutting private land with the following declaration:
When the government unilaterally authorized a
permanent, public easement across private lands, this
constitutes a taking requiring just compensation....
Because the bill provides no compensation for the
landowners whose property may be burdened by the
general recreational easement established for public use,
it violates the prohibition contained in our State and
Federal Constitutions against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
Although the State has the power to permit a
comprehensive beach access and use program by using
its eminent domain power and compensating private
property owners, it may not take property rights
without compensation through legislative decree.174
The court drove home the same points in the more recent case of
Purdie v. Attorney General.175 There, forty beachfront property owners
sued the state, alleging a taking of their property when the state
established a statutory boundary line defining public trust lands further
inland from the mean high-water mark. The language of the court is
instructive:
Having determined that New Hampshire common law
limits public ownership of the shorelands to the mean
high water mark, we conclude that the legislature went
172 Id. at 568.
1- 649 A.2d 604 (N.HL 1994).
174 Id. at 611.
1- 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999).
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beyond these common law limits by extending public
trust rights to the highest water mark.... [PIroperty
rights created by the common law may not be taken
away legislatively without due process of law. Because
[the state statute] unilaterally authorizes the taking of
private shoreland for public use and provides no
compensation for landowners whose property has been
appropriated, it violates.., the Fifth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution against the taking of property for
public use without just compensation.... Although it
may be desirable for the State to expand public beaches to cope
with increasing crowds, the State may not do so without
compensating the affected landowners.176
3. Supreme Court Precedent Precludes Expansive, Retroactive
Redefinitions of Property from the Background Principles Exception
Constitutional limits on extensions of public trust and custom flow
not only from state decisions upholding the fundamental right to
exclude others, but also from several Supreme Court decisions, not the
least of which is Lucas itself. Of particular interest is the Lucas Court's
emphatic statement that land use restrictions premised on the
"background principles" exception "cannot be newly legislated or
decreed." 17 Given their long history, the general doctrines of public
trust and custom cannot, of course, be newly decreed. Yet Lucas and
Palazzolo make clear that the dispositive question is whether the land use
restriction itself is part of shared and traditional limitations or, instead, a
novel interpretation of state law.' 8 As stated by the Lucas Court, "la]n
affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be
defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents
would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the
land is presently found."179 The objective nature of the background
principles inquiry was briefly affirmed by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas in their concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore: 8°
Similarly, our jurisprudence requires us to analyze the
background principles of state property law to
determine whether there has been a taking of property
176 Id. at 447 (emphasis added) (citing Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994)).
"77 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1029 (1992).
178 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2248 (2001); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
17 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18.
M80 531 US. 98 (2000).
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in violation of the Takings Clause. That constitutional
guarantee would, of course, afford no protection against
state power if our inquiry could be concluded by a state
supreme court holding that state property law accorded
the plaintiff no rights. 181
In his 1994 dissent to certiorari denial in Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach,' 82 Justice Scalia showed how the objective background principle
limits expansive applications of both custom and the public trust. In
Cannon Beach, coastal landowners in Oregon brought a takings suit
against the City of Cannon after it refused to grant them a permit to
build a seawall.183 In rejecting the claims, the state's supreme court
stressed that the owners had no right to build on the dry-sand area of
their property in a way that would undermine public beach access. 84
This conclusion was premised on the 1969 case of State of Oregon ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay,1ss which held that the public had a customary right to
traverse over dry-sand areas previously considered private.18 In Cannon
Beach, the court concluded that, under Thornton, the doctrine of custom
was a "background principle" of Oregon property law that precluded
the Stevens' takings claim.187
When the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Scalia in strongly dissenting to a denial of
certiorari. 1U Initially, Scalia emphasized that while a state is generally
free to define property rights under state and not federal law,
nevertheless:
A State may not deny rights protected under the Federal
Constitution... by invoking nonexistent rules of state
substantive law. Our opinion in Lucas ... would be a
nullity if anything that a state court chooses to
18 Id. at 115 n.1.
Ms 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
183 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449,450 (Or. 1993).
184 Id. at456.
195 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
18 Id. at 676-77. In Thornton, the court concluded that its decision opening up private
beaches took "from no man anything which he has a legitimate right to regard as his,"
because the right of access was based on ancient practice. Id. at 678.
187 Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d at 456.
I Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
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denominate "background law" - regardless of whether
it is really such - could eliminate property rights.189
To support the proposition that a state cannot avoid a taking simply by
asserting that property never existed,190 Scalia cited to an instructive
concurring opinion by Justice Stewart in Hughes v. Washington.19' In
awarding natural accretions to a beachfront landowner who took by
federal grant, despite a state rule to the contrary, Justice Stewart's Hughes
opinion emphasized that a retroactive judicial (re)interpretation of
riparian rights did not preclude a takings claim:
Like any other property owner, ... Mrs. Hughes may
insist, quite apart from the federal origin of her title, that
the State not take her land without just
compensation.... To the extent that the decision of the
Supreme Court of Washington.. . arguably conforms to
reasonable expectations, we must of course accept it as
conclusive. But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden
change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant
precedents, no such deference would be appropriate.
For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the
constitutional prohibition against taking property
without due process of law by the simple device of
retroactively asserting that the property it has taken
never existed at all.192
Justice Stewart's opinion in Hughes and its sanction in the dissent to
denial of certiorari thus signal that the creative construction of custom
(or public trust for that matter) will not constitute a background
principle if it is clearly out of line with state precedent'9
Scalia's dissent raised several points that further illustrate the point
at which custom or public trust becomes a retroactive alteration of
private property rights rather than an application of a "background
'1' Id. at 1207-14.
190 Id. at 1211. The dissent stated: "A State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional
prohibition against taking property without due process of law by the simple device of
asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all." Id. at 1211-12
(quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 US. 290,296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
1- 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 295-97.
M9 See Geoffrey R Scott, The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine: A Warning to Environmentalists
and Policy Makers, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 1, 57-58 (1998) (discussing the implications of
Hughes v. Washington with respect to the public trust doctrine).
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principle." In concluding that the Oregon court's rejection of the
Stevens' takings claim on custom principles was not an "objectively
reasonable" 194 application of Oregon precedent,195 Scalia stressed that the
court ignored precedent between Thornton and Cannon Beach that
appeared to limit the doctrine of custom.19 Additionally, he noted that
the Oregon court improperly interpreted Thornton, the underlying basis
for the Cannon Beach decision,197 and observed that the Oregon court's
"vacillations on the scope of the doctrine of custom... reinforce a sense
that the court is creating the doctrine rather than describing it."198
Similar problems are likely to arise if state courts continue to expand
the public trust to new areas or to "find" new trust rights (such as
environmental preservation) on traditionally impressed lands because
the bulk of state precedent limits the public trust to tidal areas for the
interests of commerce, as well as for navigation and recreational
activities."' Indeed, several recent state decisions exhibit judicial
skepticism of sudden changes in public trust law that infringe on private
property. For example, in the 1999 case of Anderson Columbia Co., Inc. v.
Board of Trustees,2'w a Florida court rejected a state agency's attempt to
assert public trust control over filled lands previously granted to private
owners in fee simple by the legislature. In so doing, the court
emphasized that "[tihe state cannot now by rule or refusal to issue an
unqualified disclaimer [of public trust rights] regain or reclaim any
interest in the affected lands. To permit such state action would
constitute an unlawful forfeiture of private property rights without just
compensation." 21 Similarly, in Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis,=2 the
New York Court of Appeals refused entreaties to extend the public trust
to waters not navigable in fact because of the sudden and unstable
impact such a decision would have on private property."' 3
194 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 US. 1003,1032 n.18 (1992).
195 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
19 Id. at 1209-10.
197 Id. at 1212 n.4.
'19 Id.
199 See Lazarus, supra note 164, at 710-16.
2w 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
an Id. at 1067.
- 89 N.Y.2d 472 (1997).
2I Id. at 483.
TRENDS IN TAKINGS LAW
IV. CONCLUSION
As Palazzolo recognized, background principles are just that firmly
embedded and long-established principles of property law, clearly and
unambiguously recognized, and universally acknowledged by the
citizens of the state in which they are claimed. Thus, when they are
restricted to their traditional and well-understood scope, custom and
public trust can help to frame those rights as background principles of a
state's property law. However, newly discovering or expanding such
principles in order to protect resources now deemed valuable and in the
public interest to preserve is inconsistent and irreconcilable with the
protection of private rights in land traditionally associated with our
system of government in the United States. As one recent court has
stated: "the desirable definiteness attendant upon discrete property
rights and principles, along with reliable, predictable expectations built
upon centuries of precedent, ought not be sacrificed to the vicissitudes of
unsupportable legal theories."2 4
- Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
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